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An investigation was made of how two different experi-
mental tools could be used to investigate an Army tactical
commander's decision-making process. The procedure was to
use a single decision; the Army battalion/task force com-
mander's decision to mass supporting artillery on a trigger
area/kill zone, and investigate the variables that affect
the decision. The experimental tools used were a question-
naire, in which an experiment on this decision was completed,
and the interactive computer wargame , JANUS , which was
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the Army
tactical commander's decision-making process. This will be
done by focussing on one tactical decision, and by describing
the factors that went into making that decision, in the form
of a mathematical model. In addition, the author will des-
cribe interactive computer wargame that adds realism to the
experiment involving tactical decision-making, and will
describe the use of the interactive wargame in analyzing
tactical decisions.
The motivation for this investigation is the desire to
come to grips with the problem of relating Command, Control,
3
and Communications (C ) to combat measures of effectiveness
(MOE) . By focussing on a single tactical decision and model-
ling it in terms of some variables that influence the decision,
a statement can be made about the information needs of the
decision-maker in making a decision. For example, if the
decision to fire a tactical nuclear weapon was based on the
size of an enemy force in a certain area, then the decision-
maker would want to know the most timely and accurate informa-
tion on the number of enemy in that area. The questions that
might be asked concerning C in this decision are what roles
3
can C p-i-ay in making the decision: An information sensor?
An information collector? An information communicator? A
3
combination of all three? In addition, how well can C be

measured in doing whatever it is supposed to do and perhaps
can C be modelled in terms of its utility as it contributes
to combat effectiveness.
The author proposes possible solutions to these questions
2 2by first defining a command and control (C ) system. The C
system will be described in terms of the well-known Lawson
model and how the model relates to tactical decision-making.
The emphasis will shift from the concept of a command and
control system to a discussion of the present Army command
and control system. More specifically the focus will be on a
mechanized infantry or armor battalion and how the commander
controls his forces. The battalion task force commander is
required to make many decisions in combat. For the purpose of
analyzing the environment in which he makes those decisions,
one decision has been chosen to be analyzed: the task force
commander's decision to mass artillery fires on a predesigna-
ted kill zone. The reasons for using this decision are: its
relatively frequent use by tactical commanders; its relative
lack of terrain dependence which sets it apart from other
tactical decisions which often are very dependent on terrain.
The impact of terrain on a decision is very difficult to
measure since no single value can be applied to any terrain
feature. The decision is made at a command level (battalion)
where a C system might be able to influence a decision.




Further experimentation is investigated by the possible
use of an interactive computer wargame, JANUS . JANUS will
be described in terms of its capabilities and its advantages
and disadvantages relative to other experimental tools. An
experiment to analyze this decision using a questionnaire was
completed. The questionnaire portrayed a situation and varied
the values of some variables believed to influence the deci-
sion. Based on the opinions of a sample of the population an
analysis was completed on what influence the variables had on
the tactical decision to mass artillery.
Finally a summary of the findings of this research is
presented. It can be shown that understanding command,
control and communications is difficult, and that one of the
greatest problems in understanding is the lack of experimental
tools to thoroughly investigate C . An attempt must first be
2
made to define C and how it can be analyzed.
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II. COMMAND AND CONTROL AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
A command and control system is normally oriented around
a piece of hardware. This hardware, whether a computer, a
radio, or a combination of the two, cannot be directly re-
lated to a combat measure of effectiveness on the battlefield
In short, a computer or communication system cannot directly
destroy an enemy tank, and no acceptable method has been
developed to relate the value of a new command and control
system with respect to the value of a new combat system such
as an M-l tank. To understand the problem and find a solu-
tion, the following questions must be answered: What are
measures of effectiveness? What is a command and control
system? How can they be related to one another?
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
If a command and control system is to be measured in
terms of some effectiveness standard, it must be understood,
in general, what is meant by effectiveness. Effectiveness
means how well a system accomplishes its mission. The mis-
sion in the Army is defeating an enemy force in land combat.
Therefore, the measure of effectiveness is how well a system
contributes to the defeat of the enemy in land combat. A
few examples of MOE are [Ref . 1: p. 4-141, 144, 145]
:
1. number of enemy tanks destroyed per unit area




3. the number of the enemy suppressed or delayed versus
the total number of enemy.
Any number of other examples can be given, however, the
predominant rationale behind any Army (MOE) is how well it
reflects the outcome on the battlefield.
Closely related to the measures of effectiveness (MOE)
are measures of performance (MOP) of a piece of equipment.
A performance measurement can be thought of as a value on a
scale that represents the capability of a piece of equipment.
In terms of a command, control, communications system, exam-
ples of MOP's are:
1. bit rate,
2. size of memory,





A proposed C system would have these and many other
measures of performance. The dilemma of the Army is that
new and improved hardware has improved MOP's over old systems
Improvements in performance, however, may not justify buying
the equipment if the new equipment cannot measureably improve
effectiveness on the battlefield.
B. A COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTExM
Prior to discussing a command and control system, commu-
3
nications, the third part of the acronym C is addressed.
Communications is constantly needed by a tactical commander.
13

When a new communications systems is developed, it must meet
the requirements specified in the required operational capa-
bility (ROC) guidelines. The MOE * s are slightly different,
since its contribution to defeating an enemy force, although
not measurable in terms of the firepower like a tank, can be
assumed of great importance. Communications is easily
modelled and can be degraded for realism in a simulation or
an interactive wargame . In approaching the problem of rela-
2ting effectiveness of a C system, the assumption of communi-
cations will be given in the experiment. Without a medium
2
to transmit information, a C system, especially one that
incorporates automation, does not exist. However, the
assumption will be addressed more formally later.
JC Pub. Number 1 defines:
"Command control is the exercise of authority and
direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned forces in the accomplishment of his mission."
It further states that:
"A command and control system comprises the facilities,
equipment, communications, procedures and personnel
essential to a commander for planning, directing and
controlling the operations of assigned forces pursuant
to the mission assigned." [Ref. 2: p. 116]
A command and control system that is defined in this man-
ner is not a single piece of hardware. It is also the human
interaction with a machine, as well as human to human inter-
action. The complexity of the system is not only difficult
to understand; it is almost impossible for a national level
14

decision- maker/ fund- controller to decide exactly what the
system encompasses, and how to improve it. Dr. Joel Lawson
of the Naval Electronic Systems Command developed a simpli-
2fied model of a C process. Instead of attempting to model
the entire system, he concentrated on its different functions.
An illustration of the model is shown in Figure 1 [Ref. 3:
p. 72].
2
In this example of a C process, SENSE represents the
sensor and intelligence information obtained from the combat
environment. SENSE is the input that a decision-maker needs
to address in the next step in the model. Intelligence and
sensors have made the greatest improvements in the command
and control process, because the advance in technology has
been available. There are still many problems resulting
from these advances, most notably fusing all the information
available and eliminating redundant and unnecessary information
COMPARE is simply the comparison of alternate courses of
action. The desired state is normally the accomplishment of
a mission directed by higher headquarters. Lawson developed
2
a more complex model of the C process to show the various
levels of a military hierarchy. However, the basic model is
the same at all levels.
DECIDE is the decision by a commander based on his com-
parison of alternate plans. Once the decision has been made,












Figure 1. Lawson ' s Simplified Model
decision. The two arrows coming out of ACT refer to the
result of the ACT on the ENVIRONMENT and the feedback that
the sensors get based on the action.
Of all the functions in the Lawson model, ENVIRONMENT is
the least understood analytically but the most important.
The environment directly or indirectly influences every other
step. It is not intuitive as to how one describes it and it
is not easy to determine exactly how it influences the others
16

However, if a command and control system is to be improved,
the process of command and control must be well understood
and the environment must be defined. It is the author's
contention that the four factors: SENSE, COMPARE, DECIDE,
ACT, make up a decision process. It is also the author's
contention that the decision process developed by Lawson in
2his C model can be analyzed in terms of the environmental
variables that influence this process. This statement must
be qualified, however, that this is only true of a single
decision, not all tactical decisions. It is reasonable to
assume that the variables of the environment are different
for each decision. It follows that an analysis of Army
tactical decision making should be done prior to designing
an experiment to analyze the environmental parameters that
affect the decision.
C. ARMY TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING
An Army tactical commander makes many different decisions
during the course of a battle. It is extremely difficult to
determine the value of each decision since all relate to the
mission of the commander's unit. It can be concluded that if
a commander has successfully accomplished his mission, then
the decisions made contributed to the mission's success. It
would appear on the surface that a tactical commander's deci-
sion that results in the enemy being destroyed or delayed,
while the commander's own forces receive only light casualties,
would mean that a decision or decisions were favorable.
17

Conversely, a decision that results in heavy casualties of
a commander's own force would not be thought of as favorable
Yet, during the course of battle, if the heavy casualties
taken by a subordinate unit resulted in a favorable maneuver
to decisively defeat the enemy, perhaps the latter decision
by the commander was not unfavorable. An effective decision
is a difficult one to define and beyond the scope of this
paper. For the purpose of this analysis, an effective deci-
sion will be one that defeats the enemy or disrupts his
attack and a poor decision will be one in which the friendly
forces suffer heavy casualties while allowing the enemy to
continue the attack.
Having defined, in a relative manner, the effectiveness
of a decision, the environmental variables that directly
influence the decision-making process will be examined.
Generally, the variables fall into four categories:
1. The mission given by higher headquarters.
2. The enemy force's strength and disposition.
3. The terrain in which the unit is located and
fighting
.
4. The commander's own forces available to him.
A tactical commander makes decisions based on any of the
four environmental categories. Each decision is normally
part of an overall operational plan; however, each part of
the plan requires a decision that is more dependent on one
18

variable than others. It is entirely possible that one deci-
sion will affect another, but as a logical first step and
for the purpose of analysis, each decision will be isolated
and treated individually. Some decisions may be more diffi-
cult to model than others. It was previously stated that a
decision is based on four categories. The human may react
beyond these, based on a variable that does not fall into one
of these categories, therefore, analysis becomes difficult.
A typical example is the commander's "gut feeling" about a
problem that has confronted him. He makes his decision based
on his own feeling, in addition to the environmental factors.
This "feeling" has historically separated some commanders
from others. The predictability of such an action can only be
done by examining each commander, not by analyzing the decision.
An analysis of this type would have difficulty separating the
commander from the decision. The commander's own personality
would be difficult to distinguish from the variables that
affect the situation that require the commander to make a
decision. The only course, then, is to judiciously choose
decisions that will not be influenced to a great extent by
the individual commander's personal feelings, or to leave
that out completely.
One decision must be chosen initially to model. This has
been previously done with a fire/no fire decision by a tank
commander [Ref. 4: p. 4] . The one chosen in this paper is a task
19

force commander's decision to mass his artillery fires on a
pre-designated trigger area or kill zone. By doctrine, a
battalion/task force commander has a single battery of artil-
lery to support his forces. A battery is composed of eight
155 mm howitzers. Should it become necessary, however, addi-
tional batteries of artillery may be used on a pre-designated
trigger/area. This would be called massing artillery, and is
the decision of the ground commander to use his artillery in
such a manner if he thinks it is appropriate. Massing artil-
lery fires is a common task done by a task force commander,
and can also be done at the company/team level depending on
the mission. The variables involved in making the decision
are potentially quantifiable. The experiment should be de-
signed to find the values of those variables.
D. BATTALION/TASK FORCE STRUCTURE
A basic understanding of the structure of a battalion
task force and the players involved in the decision to mass
artillery fires is necessary prior to conducting any experi-
ment or analysis. Figure 2 shows the organization of a bat-
talion/task force.
The task force commander uses his operations officer
(S-3) to coordinate the plan for direct fires (tanks, anti-
tank missiles and infantry ) and indirect fires. His prin-


























Figure 2. Task Force Organization
officer (FSO) . It is the job of the FSO to insure that the
task force commander has enough indirect fire from artillery
to support his concept of operations. The FSO combines the
fires from the organic 107 mm mortar platoon into his plan to
support needs of the task force. Normal calls for fire come
from the company/team's fire support team (FIST). The FIST
requests indirect fires to support the team commander's
21

operations. The FSO receives the request, then transmits the
request to an indirect fire unit depending on the type of
target and the capability of artillery or mortars [Ref . 5]
.
The principle of a "kill zone" is to concentrate the
direct and indirect fires on a specific area. This principle
has long been the tactic used in an ambush, but several facts
about the threat have led to its use on a much larger scale.
The Warsaw Pact has developed its forces that force Army
doctrine to adapt to counter the enemy development.
The enemy is a force of superior size who is attempting
to move at a high rate of speed to build up momentum. The
enemy also uses very centralized control of his forces and
is willing to sustain losses to maintain the momentum of the
attack. The kill zone is a means of controlling the task
force fires to take advantage of the enemy's potential weak-
nesses.
The structure of a kill zone is normally a plot of ground
around which the task force is deployed and against which the
majority of direct fires can be directed. The FSO will be
given the location and size of the kill zone and plot enough
pre-planned targets to cover the area with a large volume of
artillery. The task force commander will use the kill zone
similar to that of an ambush kill zone in that he will nor-
mally wait until a large number of enemy vehicles are in the
area, then fire on the enemy with a large volume of fire.
22

The purpose, is to create a great deal of confusion among the
enemy, as well as disrupting the. attack, and taking the
momentum away from the enemy's attack. The decision to mass
artillery fires is made by the task force commander. It is
his decision based on information that he receives from his
subordinates as to when the attack should begin. The FSO
and all supporting artillery are standing ready to fire once,
the decision is made.
The next chapter will focus on an experiment designed to
investigate the variables that affect a commander's decision
to mass artillery. The analysis will depend heavily on the
judgment of experts in armored and infantry tactics.
23

III. THE DECISION ANALYZED USING A QUESTIONNAIRE
A. INTRODUCTION
The questionnaire is one cf the experimental tools that
may be used to analyze tactical decisions. The intent of
this chapter is to show how a questionnaire can be used to
quantify a tactical decision based on independent variables.
The author conducted an experiment using a questionnaire as
the experimental tool. The outline of the experiment, the
data and the analyses of this data are included in this
chapter, in Appendix A and B.
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE EXPERIMENT
The objective of the experiment is to obtain a mathemati-
cal model that describes the criticality of a designated
trigger area for the massing of artillery fires.
C. THE APPROACH
The approach was to first obtain the independent variables
for the questionnaire by querying several Army officers as to
what factors would influence the decision to fire artillery
on a designated trigger area. Each officer was given a
tactical situation and asked to be the battalion commander in
the situation. He was then asked to enumerate the factors
that would influence his decision to fire. The results
obtained were seventeen different variables for the situation,
24

essentially divided into three categories: enemy related,
friendly forces related, and factors related to the physical
environment. These seventeen factors were then used to
obtain the independent variables for an experiment using a
questionnaire
.
The questionnaire was designed to be given to a sample
population of Army officers familiar with battlefield tactics.
For the purpose of simplification of the analysis, not all
seventeen factors were used as variables in the questionnaire.
An abbreviated version of the total experiment was conducted
using four of the factors found in the survey as independent
variables
.
The experiment consisted of a questionnaire that depicted
a tactical situation on a map and some information pertaining
to the enemy and friendly situation. The subject analyzed the
tactical situation, and responded to two questions concerning
the situation. The responses to these two questions constitute
the dependent variables of the experiment. As a result of the
informal survey, the following factors were found that might
influence a battalion commander to mass artillery fires on the
trigger area.
1. Enemy Related
CI) Size of the advanced guard.
(2) Size and location of the Second Echelon.
(3) Types of enemy vehicles.




(5) The number of enemy forces in the trigger area.
(6) Size, activity, location, unit, time and equipment




(1) The degree of camouflage of the friendly forces.




(4) Response capability of the available artillery.
(5) The degree of coordination with direct fire
systems.
3. Environmental Related
(1) Size and location of the trigger area.
(2) Wind conditions.
(3) Time available for coordinated indirect fires.
(4) Daylight conditions.
(5) Visibility conditions.
From these seventeen variables, four were chosen for the
questionnaire. They were chosen as a result of the frequency
in which they appeared on the informal questionnaire. The
independent variables and their possible values are described
below.
D. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND THEIR POSSIBLE VALUES
1. The Number of Enemy Forces in the Trigger Area
CI) Less than 10 vehicles in the trigger area.
(2)_ 10-20 vehicles in the trigger area.
(3) 20-30 vehicles in the trigger area.




The Intelligence Report on the Enemy Follow-on Force
(1) A battalion to regimental size force less than 30
minutes from the task force's present positions.
(2) A battalion to regimental size force 30-60 minutes
from the task force's present positions.
(3) A battalion to regimental size force greater than
60 minutes from the task force's present positions.
(4) No information is currently available about the
follow-on enemy force.
3 The Mission of the Friendly Force




The Response Time for the Supporting Artillery
(1) Massed artillery on the trigger area in less than
2 minutes.
(2) Massed artillery on the trigger area in 2-4
minutes.
(3) Massed artillery on the trigger area in 4-6 minutes
(4) Massed artillery on the trigger area in more than
6 minutes.
Several assumptions are made for this experiment. The reasons
for these assumptions are numerous , however , the main reason
is to insure that treatments were not in conflict with other
variables not being analyzed. Clarity of the experiment is
also important. The questionnaire must make clear to the
subject what is being investigated, the assumptions, and an
understanding of the sample trial. The assumptions for this
experiment are discussed below.
27

E. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE EXPERIMENT
(1) The trigger area is within the maximum effective
range of the friendly anti-armor weapons. Specifically the
trigger area must be within 20Q0 meters for tanks and 3000
meters for heavy anti-tank, weapons such as the TOW.
(2) The task organization for the friendly forces remains
the same throughout the experiment. No additions or deletions
will be made to the battalion's organization.
(3) Daylight conditions exist throughout the experiment.
Visibility will not be inhibited by natural or artificial
means
.
(4) Enemy vehicles will be standard Warsaw Pact medium
tanks, as well as BRDM or BMP equipped with SAGGER anti-tank
missiles.
(5) The friendly forces are defending along the forward
line of troops (FLOT) . The covering force has passed through
the friendly forces who are in a defensive posture, and are
about to engage in their initial action of the battle.
(6) The enemy is attacking in classic Warsaw Pact
echeloned formations. The lead element is normally a
reconnaissance element, followed by the advanced guard,
and then the main body.
(7) The friendly forces are at full strength in both
personnel and equipment.
(8) The information given to the commander to make his
decisions is not perfect information, but rather it is
reported information from his own assets.
28

(9) Artillery ammunition is sufficient to allow the.
artillery to support the. mission.
(10) The battalion in this situation has priority of fires.
(11) The direct support artillery has preplanned its fires
on the trigger area.
(12) The trigger area/kill zone has been defined in the




The experiment was designed to investigate the criticality
of the information as to whether a tactical decision maker
would mass artillery fires and whether he would actually fire
or not based on the four variables previously described. A
full factorial design was chosen so that each of the treat-
ments might be analyzed and interactions among variables could
be investigated. Since three of the four variables had four
levels, some transformations were required to put the treat-
ments into the desired HIGH-LOW format through creation of
pseudo variables.
The technique used to transform the four levels of each
variable was to create two pseudo variables, each with a
value of HIGH and LOW. Figure 3 shows how the four levels
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Figure 3. Matrix of Transformation.
The same procedure is used for the variables "The
intelligence report on the enemy follow-on forces" and
"The response time for the supporting artillery".
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If one examines the technique of creating pseudo varia-
bles, it is evident that difficulties in interpretation of
interaction effects among variables may arise. The technique
used to analyze interactions was to use a mean value differen-
tial analysis. This technique will be discussed later in this
chapter [Ref. 6: p. 106].
The experiment has been designed so that the seven varia-
bles are transformed from four variables (three with four
levels and one with two levels) to an experiment with seven
variables each with two levels. The criteria for a full
factorial design experiment have now been met.
A full factorial experiment required 2 7 or 12 8 treatments.
Each of the treatments was applied to the questionnaire by
using the transformation matrix shown in Figure 3.
An example might be the treatment: A E F G. This implies
that the values for each of seven treatments are: A^-,—, B_^T7
CLOW DLOW EHIGH FHIGH GHIGH * Using the transfo™ tables, the
questionnaire depicts the values of the four variables as:
10-20 vehicles in the trigger area, a battalion to regimental
size force less than 30 minutes from the task force's present
positions, the mission of the task force is to defend in





Three replications of each of the 12 8 treatments were
collected during the experiment for a total of 3 84 data
points. The treatments were divided up in a random order and
given to 24 subjects. Each subject had sixteen different
situations, without replication. Selected individuals were
given a duplicate treatment to one of their sixteen to check
for consistency in their decisions. Each subject was given a
general situation which included the assumptions, a map and
tactical overlay, and the sixteen (or seventeen) situations.
The subject was asked to analyze the situation and specific
values of the variables. He was then asked two questions:
the first was to assess the criticality of the trigger area
using information from the four variables as to whether he
would mass artillery; the second question was whether he
would mass fires or not. An example of a typical set of
questionnaires with the general situation is given in Appendix
A.
The subjects were made up of Army senior enlisted men and
officers ranging in grade from E-6 to 0-5. The only restric-
tion was to require that all personnel be infantry, armor or
artillery by specialty. This was to insure that the data base
came from subjects with expertise in Army battalion level
tactics. The subjects were given unlimited time to perform
the test. This may or may not have influenced the results.
Unlimited time may have caused interest to be lost in the
32

latter treatments. On the other hand, had a time limit been
set, time may have become a variable in the experiment with
no ability to analyze its effect. The results of the data
collection are given in Appendix B.
H. DATA ANALYSIS
The motivation for this experiment was to investigate the
effect of four variables on a specific decision. The data
collected for this experiment may be analyzed in great depth
and thoroughness from several different perspectives. The
author chose to analyze two specific areas and to limit the
scope of the analysis to the effects on only one of the
dependent variables.
The dependent variable analyzed is the index of criticality
The treatments that significantly affected this dependent
variables are investigated and a possible explanation for their
significance is discussed. A regression analysis of the sig-
nificant factors on this dependent variable has been completed
and a model is presented which describes the influence of the
independent variables on this decision.
The computer program used for analyzing the data was
written for a thesis by Glenn J. Broussard [Ref. 4: p. 13]
who used a fractional factorial design to investigate the fire/
no fire decision of a tank, commander based on eleven variables.
CPT Broussard *s analysis goes into great detail on the princi-
ples behind each of the specific analysis techniques. Detailed




The purpose of this analysis is to investigate a decision
in terms of four variables. The influence of these variables
can be described in quantitative terms. The significance of
this capability may stimulate research on quantifying decision-
making using other tools for analysis such as computer simula-
tions or interactive computer wargames.
1. Tools of Analysis and Transformations
The primary tool used in this analysis was the
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) . The assumptions of the ANOVA are
(1) Observations are. drawn from normally distributed
populations
.
(2) Observations represent random samples of the
population.
(3) Variances of the population are equal.
It is assumed that the observations represent random
samples of the populations. The first assumption implies that
the errors associated with the observations are also normally
distributed. This was tested using the Kolmogorov-Simnov 1
Sample Test. The assumption of equal variances was tested
using Barlett's test of homogeneity of variance. The hypo-
thesis tests for both of these assumptions are shown below.
Assumption 1:
H : e, = e~ = e_ = e,~ Q for all treatments areo 1 2 3 128
distributed N(.Q,6 2 ).







E n : o = a = a = ... a = a
i 2 3 128 e
H, : Some a 2 are not equal.
The criterion for rejection of both assumptions is if the
right hand tail probability associated with the test statistic
calculated for each test is less than .05. The results of
these tests are shown in Table I. Based on the results of the
Kolmogorov-Simnov 1 Sample test andBartletts test the null
hypothesis was accepted, since the results of both test were
greater than the .05 test statistic used in the evaluation of
the tests.
Recall that the random sample of 24 subjects crossed
various lines of rank and specialty. It was apparent that
difficulties might occur in the differences in the scaling
of the dependent variable between subjects. CPT Broussard
used a common technique that helps to resolve the scaling
problems that could occur in the data [Ref. 4: p. 66]. The
transformation was to rescale the data from to 100 to a
scale of to 1, with the minimum observation set to zero.
In addition, other transformations were tried to allow the
data to conform to the assumptions of the ANOVA. Among
those tried were
:
1. y' = y
2. y' = y
2
3. y» = y
4
.




**************** ****** :$* *** *** ** ** * ** ****** *
* STATISTICS FOR TESTING ANOVA ASSUMPTIONS *
**$ ***** ******** ****** * ********* ************
E/SRTLETT TEST FCR HOMOGENEITY OF CELL VARIANCES
S /l (CHI SQUARE) : 114.3362
CEGREES OF FREEDOM : 127
FROetX .GT. M/C) : 0.782525
F M£X RATIO
S**2(MAX) / S**2(MIM : 211.0000
G (NUMBER OF CELLS) : 128
CEGREES OF FREEDOM FCR EACHS : 2
KS TEST FCR NORMALITY ASSUMPTION
KS STATISTIC (DMAX) : 0.061365
NUMBER OF POINTS : 128




TREATMENT OBSERVED VALUES PR5CICTEC VALUE RESICUAL
ABD 0.6500 0.9040 -0.2540 **
ADEF 0.4-200 0.6762 -0.2462 **
ABC«=G 0.6 667 0.8883 -0.2217 **
ACF 0.5667 0.7812 -0.2146 **
AE 0.4667 0.6779 -0.2112 **
A3CG 0.7300 0.9294 -0.1994
ABEF 0.7233 0.9192 -0.1958
ACFG 0.60CC C.7802 -0. 1802
ACDFG 0.5833 0.7385 -0. 1552
ABDEG 0.7000 0.8365 -0.1365
eCEG 0.6 133 G.74C8 -0. 1275
ABCF 0.7633 0.3894 -0.1260
ABCDFG 0.7233 C.8467 -0.1233
CDE 0.3767 0.4969 -0. 1202
ACEF 0.6 167 0.7342 -0,1175
ABEFG 0.9 167 1.C327 -0. 1160
ABOE 0.7267 0.8375 -0.1108
F 0.4267 0.5283 -0.1017
AOG 0.5867 0.6823 -0. C956
ABCDG 0.8 000 0.8877 -0.0877
A 0. 75C0 0. 8375 -0.0875
AC DEC 0.6467 0.7335 -0.0869
ABCE C.8900 0.9 7 54 -0.0854
CDG 0.4633 0. 5440 -0.0806
ACDF 0.6667 0.7396 -0.0729
BCD 0.4667 0.5385 -0.0719
ACG 0.7500 0.8212 -0. C712
AG 0.6 533 0.7 240 -C.0706
ACCE 0.6633 0.7325 -0.0692
ACCEFG 0.5 133 0.5790 -C.0656
ACEFG 0.5 567 0.6206 -0.0640
ABCF 0.7667 C.83C4 -0.0638
AEG 0.6133 0.6769 -0.0635
CDEFG 0.2 S33 0.3433 -0.0600
ACEG 0.7167 0.7752 -0. C585
ABEG 0.8 200 0.8781 -0.0581
ABCEFG 0.9333 0.9910 -0.0577
AEFG 0.7767 0.8315 -0.0548
DEF C.3867 0.4406 -0.0540
CEFG 0.3333 0.3850 -0.0517
ABC 0.7667 0.8158 -0.G492
ABF 0.8233 0.8721 -0.0487
AOEG 0.5867 0.6352 -0. C485
BDEF 0.5933 0.6419 -0.0485
ABOFG 0.7 833 C.8315 -0.0481
ABC5G 0.9333 0.9765 -0.0431
E C.4CC0 0.4423 -0.0423
ABCCEG 0.8933 C.9348 -C. 0415
BCDEF 0.6 167 0.6531 -0.0415
AC 0.6667 0.7077 -0.0410
CDF 0.4667 0.5040 -0.C373
ABE 0.8433 0.8792 -0.0358
ABCDF 0.8 133 C. 6477 -0.03^4
ACDG 0.7467 0.7796 -0.0329
AFG 0.7 333 0.7650 -0.0317





TREATMENT OBSERVED VALUES PREDICTEC VALUE RESICUAL
ABCG 0. 7667 C.7904 -0.0233
ABCCE 0.9 123 0.9338 -C.0204
ACD 0.6467 0.6660 -0.0194
AB 0.9 26 7 0.9456 -0.0190
D 0.5500 0.5602 -0.0102
ABFG 0.8667 0.8731 -0.0065
ADEFG 0.7833 0.78 c 8 -0.0065
A8CEF 0.9300 0.9354 -0.0054
ABCDEF 0.8900 G.8938 -0.0038
AOE 0.6 233 0.6362 -C. CC2<?
C 0.4 700 0.4721 -0.0021
ABCEFG 0.8200 0.8219 -0.0019
CEFG 0.5533 0.5542 -C.0C08
BCEF 0.7000 0.6993 0.0002
BCFG 0.6533 0.6527 C.0006
CD 0.4333 0.4304 0.0029
G 0.4 933 0.4883 0.0050
ABCO 0.7800 0.7742 0. C058
BEFG 0.8033 0.7971 0.0063
BEF C. 6 9 C C 0.6835 0.0065
ACE 0.7 633 0.7742 0. C092
BF 0.6500 0.6365 0.0135
AD 0.8 133 0.7958 0.0175
DF 0.5 133 0.4867 C.0267
CG 0.6133 0.5856 0.0277
BCDEFG 0.5 800 0. 5446 0.0354
BCDF 0.6500 0.6121 0.C379
BCEFG 0.6267 0.5862 0.0404
BDEFG 0.7967 C.7554 0.0413
OFG 0.5300 0.4877 0.0423
BCDG 0.7C0O 0.6521 0.0479
AEF 0.7667 0.7179 0. C488
ABCDEFG 0.8 300 0.7802 0.C498
ABG 0.8833 0.8321 0.0513
FG 0.5833 0.5294 C.0540
3E 0.7 000 0.6435 0.0565
BG 0.6533 0.5 C'65 0.0569
BEG 0.7000 0.6425 0.C575
ADFG 0.7 833 0.7233 0.0600
(1 ) 0.6633 0.6019 0.0615
ABDEF 0.9400 0.8775 0.0625
DE 0.4 633 0.4006 0.0627
CEG 0.4633 0.3996 0. 0638
EFG 0.6667 0.5953 0.0708
BDG 0.6267 0. 5548 0.0719
BCG 0.7667 0.6937 O.C72 c
BDE 0.6800 0.6019 0.0781
BDF 0.68CC 0. 5948 0.0852
BDFG 0.6833 0.5958 0.0875
AOF 0.8 167 0.7223 0.0944
BDEG 0. 7000 C.60C8 0.0992
AF 0.8700 0.7640 0.1060
ACDEF 0. 8C33 0.6925 0.1108
CO EG 0.6 100 0,4^79 0.1121
BC 0.6967 0.5802 0.116 5



























0.6 333 0.5029 0.1304
C.63CC 0.4985 0.1315
0.7 500 0.6110 0.1390
0.8 800 0.7398 0.1402
0.8033 0.6537 C. 1496
0.8 500 0.6992 0.150 8
0.3 633 C.71C0 0.1533
0.6967 0.5396 C.1571
0.8 433 0.6683 0.1750
0.8 367 0.6375 0. 19Q2
0.6467 0.4467 0.2000
0.6 633 0.4823 0.2010
0.9167 0.6981 0.2135 **
0.8167 0.5446 0.2721 **
0.8 36 7 0. 5456 0.2910 **




5 . y = In y
6. y* = arcsin y
7. y* = arcsin y Y
Several of these transformations allowed the data to
favorably agree with the ANOVA assumptions. It was decided,
however, not to use any of the transformations mentioned
since none of those tried caused the data to more favorably
agree with the assumptions.
The resulting conclusions are based on the data itself
and not additional transformations, other than for scaling.
I. ANALYSIS OF TREATMENT EFFECTS
The generalized ANOVA (Table II) for the experimental
shows the sum of squares and the degrees of freedom for each
of the sources. It also shows the mean square of the residual
which will be used in computing F-statistics in the following
treatment ANOVA.
The treatment ANOVA in Table III depicts the results of
some different computations to be used in the analysis of the
results. There were no aliases in this experiment, which is
the reason for a blank in this column. The mean square for
each term and the computed F-statistics are self-explanatory.
In conducting this analysis, the difference between the fact
that a treatment is significant and the effect of that treat-
ment on the result must be clarified. A factor is significant
if the sum of squares when that treatment is high plus the sum





SOURCE SS OF MS
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WITHIN 8L0CKS £ REPS
TREATMENTS
FES ICUAL (WITHIN) 8.352 254












2/3 PI MEAN F PROB
SOURCE ALIASE OF EFFECT SQUARE STATISTIC (X.GT. F )
A ]L 0.118 1.332 40.523 0.000 a* -£ **- *y
a : L 0. 1 1 3 1.332 40.523 0.000 ****
B L 0.155 2.297 69.859 C.OOO ***#
C ] -0.006 0.003 0.103 0.749
D IL -0. 42 0. 167 5.069 0.025 **
E 1 -0.005 0.003 0.086 C.770
F 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.919
G L -0.0 CI 0. 000 0.005 0.942
FG 1 -0.002 0.000 0.007 0.933
EG ] -0.002 0.000 0.007 0.933
EF L -0.0 13 0. 016 0.487 0.486




df :L -0.0C1 0.000 0.006 C.937
DFG } -0.002 0.000 0.007 0.913
OE L 0.0 C5 0. 002 0.061 0.805
DEG 1 -0.003 0.001 0.023 C.879
DEF ] -0. 07 0.005 0.138 0.711
cc : L -0.0 25 0. 060 1.825 0.1^8
CF ] -0.041 0.158 4.794 0.029 **
CFG : -0.057 0.315 9.533 0.002 ***#
CE L 0.032 0. 101 3.064 0.081
CEG ] -0.056 0.304 9.238 0.003 ***#
cef :L -0.057 0. 309 9.40a 0.002 $#*#
CO ] 0.002 0.000 0.014 C.9C6
CDG ] 0.0 09 0.008 0.234 0.629
CDF : L 0.0C7 0. 00 5 0.160 0.6°0
CDE ] 0.009 0.007 0.218 0.641
bg : L -0. 0C4 0.002 0.046 0.831
BF L -0.0 14 0.018 0.544 0.462
BFG ] 0.022 0.045 1.371 0.243
BE 1L 0.0 47 0. 20 8 6.330 0.012 **
BEG ] -0.000 0.000 0.001 C.982
3EF 3 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.933
3D ]L 0.0 14 0. 018 C. 544 0.462
BDG ] 0.005 0.002 0.061 0.805
BDF L 0.014 0.020 0.595 0.441
BDE ]L 0.022 0.045 1.357 C.245
BC ] 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.955
BCG : L -0. 0C3 0. 001 0.034 0.853
BCF ] 0.004 0.001 0.037 0.848
BCE ] 0.0 11 0.012 0.356 0.551
BCD ]L 0.0 22 0. 04 5 1.371 0.243
AG ] -0.011 0.013 0.383 0.536
AF 0.0 C8 0.006 0.178 0.673
AFG L -0.0C5 0.003 0.086 C.77C
AE i 0.015 0.023 0.685 0.4Q9
AEG ]L 0.0 16 0. 023 0.713 0.399
AEF ] 0.028 0.077 2.327 0.123
AD ] 0.0 24 0.054 1.632 0.203
ADC- ]L -0.0 18 0. 032 0.95Q 0.328
AOF ] 0.023 0.053 1.604 0.207
ADE -0. 0C4 0.002 0.059 0.809
AC -0.009 0.007 0.213 C.645
** INCICATES THAT P(X.GT.F) IS LESS THAN .05
**** INDICATES THAT P(X.GT.F) IS LESS THAN .01
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2/3 FI MEAN F PRCB
SOURCE 4LIASE DF EFFECT SQUARE STATISTIC ( X.GT.F
)
ACG -O.O03 0.001 0.023 C.879
ACF -0.0 31 0.090 2.738 0.099
ACE 0.028 0. 07 7 2.344 0.127
ACC 0.026 0.063 1.917 0.167
AB -0.0 10 0.010 0.304 0.582
ABG 0.012 0. 013 0.405 0.525
ABF 0.014 0.020 0.603 0.438
ABE 0.013 0.032 0.959 0.328
ABC -0.020 0.039 1.192 0.276
ABC 0.018 0.031 0.948 0.331
** INCICATES THAT P(X.GT.F) IS LESS THAN .05
**** INDICATES THAT P(X.GT.F) IS LESS THAN .01
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freedom for each, minus the grand mean divided hy the total
degrees of freedom, is greater than the F-statistic computed
for that treatment. The effect of a treatment, for example,
with one variable (main effect treatment! is simply the mean
value of the treatment when the value is HIGH minus the mean
value of the treatment when its value is LOW, or simply stated
Effect = hE1QR - ALQW
The difficulty in the analysis comes when trying to ex-
plain the effects of a treatment with a two or three variable
interaction that has been found to be significant. The only
means of analyzing this effect is to use a technique called
mean value differential analysis [Ref. 5: p. 106]. A complete
analysis using this technique is beyond the scope of this
thesis. For the purposes of understanding how a two or three
factor interaction might be analyzed, an example is given
using a significant three -factor interaction found in this
analysis
.
The basic thrust of this analysis is to determine the mean
value of the responses for specified high and low values of
the variables in the interaction term, averaged over high and
low values of all other variables. The procedure begins by
computing the mean response of the first variable in the inter-
action at its high and low level. Next, the mean response of
the second variable is computed at its high and low level for
each level of the first variable. This process is continued
for all factors in the interaction. This process is best
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demonstrated by an example. Using the significant inter-
action treatment CFG, a mean value differential analysis
will be conducted. The mean value for C„__„ is: 0.6842.
rlJ-Lirl
The mean value for CT ~,, is: 0.5412. The mean values forLOW
F
fI
_ GH and FLQW will be computed given C is HIGH or C is LOW.
The same is true for the mean values of GTT -,.-TT and GT „ T givenHIGH LOW '








CHIGH (0 - 63 >
FHIGH (0 - 32 >









CLOW (0 ' 54)
FHIGH (0 ' 51)









Figure 4 . Mean-Value Differential Diagram.
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Each of the mean values for the different variables
represents the mean value of that variable, given that the
value of its predecessor is HIGH or LOW. For example, the
mean value of 0.65 for GLQW is the mean value for GLQW given
F_-r, and C__ T7 . Another example, the mean value is 0.82 forLOW LOW r '
b°th GHIGH and GL0W 9±Ven FHIGR and SilGH
.
Interpreting the effects on interaction treatments can
be done using mean value differential analysis. If, for
example, C is HIGH, the variable F will have a stronger
effect on variable CTjrTr,TJ when the value of F is HIGH also.
This is because the mean value of Fu _^u given (!____-_ is greater
rl J. LjiI ri J. Liri
than the mean value for F_^T7 . On the other hand, becauseLOW '
GHIGH and GL0W haVS thS Same Value g±Ven FHIGH and CHIGH'
this means G will have no stronger effect on F„ Tr, t . for either
FHIGH °r GL0W*
This is the method used to determine the effects of the
significant interaction treatments. A detailed analysis using
mean value differential analysis will not be done, however,
this example is shown to introduce the proper way to analyze
the effects of significant two or three factor interactions.
Several variables were found to be significant at the 0.0 5
level and a few at the 0.01 level. Only two and three factor
interactions were investigated in this analysis. As shown
with mean value differential analysis, interpretation of the
effects of two and three factor interactions is difficult.
Beyond three factor would not only be difficult to analyze
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but a lengthy and difficult process using mean value differen-
tial analysis. The significant factors at the 0.05 level are:
A, B, D, CF, CFG, CEG, CEF and BE.
In analyzing the effect of the significant factors it was
stated that the effect for the main effect treatments is the
difference in the mean value of the HIGH and LOW levels for
that main treatment. A positive difference is interpreted to
influence the index of criticality to a higher value. The
information was interpreted by the subject to be more favorable
in his inclination to call for massed artillery on the trigger
area/kill zone. A negative effect means a negative difference
in the mean values and has the opposite interpretation of the
positive effect. The index of criticality will tend to move
downward
.
1. An Analysis of the Simple Main Effects
Three of the main effects were found to be significant
A, B, D. A and B were found to have positive effects while D
has a negative effect. In the design of the experiment, some
of the variables were grouped in pairs to provide a means for
analysis of a single variable with four levels. For example,
the factors A and B are pseudo factors whose high and low
values represent four levels of the single variable "number of
vehicles"
.
Although this may be convenient for design, the
results of the analysis may be difficult to interpret because
one of the two variables may be lacking in definition. Such.
is the case for the variable, A.
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A was found to be significant, however, the possible
values for A as shown in Figure 3 are:
A^ = less than 10 vehicles in the kill zone
or = 20-30 vehicles in the kill zone
A^Q = 10-20 vehicles in the kill zone
or = more than 30 vehicles in the kill zone
No clear physical explanation is possible to explain
the implication of the mean value of A being positive.
The treatment 3 also had a positive effect, but unlike
the treatment, A, the positive mean value can be explained.
The possible values for B from Figure 3 are:
B„ Trt] = 20-30 vehicles in the kill zone.
or = more than 30 vehicles in the kll zone
BLOW
= 10~20 vehicles in the kill zone
or = less than 10 vehicles in the kill zone
Clearly, it can be seen that a value of twenty vehicles is
a separation value of the treatment. It can be concluded
that if more than 20 vehicles are in the kill zone, the
index of critical! ty is 0.155 higher than when less than
20 vehicles are present (see Table III
•
A similar condition exists for treatment D. The
values of D from Figure 4 are:
D = follow-on force is greater than 60 minutes
away
or = no information is available
DLOW
= t*le follow-on force is 30-60 minutes away




The value that is the difference between D G and D w is
60 minutes. It can be concluded that a value of greater than
60 minutes results in a decrease in the index of criticality
of 0.042 relative to a time of less than 60 minutes.
2
.
The Analyses of the Two and Three Factor
Interactive Effects
As stated earlier the analysis of two and three factor
interactions requires further analysis and is beyond the scope
of this thesis. It must be concluded that there are significant
negative effects between the intelligence available and artil-
lery response time (CF and CFG); between available intelligence,
the mission of the friendly forces and artillery response time
(CEF and CEG). and a positive effect on the interaction between
the number of vehicles in the trigger area/kill zone the mission
of the friendly forces (BE)
.
3. Analysis of the Selected Model
Table IV shows the results of the regression analysis.
2Variance accounted for by regression or the "R " term is
approximately 0.44. Variance accounted for by the selected
model is 0.35619. A variance, of Q.44 is judged to be fairly
reasonable considering the subjective nature of both the
treatments and the dependent variables. The resulting model
based on the statistics in Table V is the following:






0.02083X, - 0.02Q26X.X, -
4 3&
0.02865X. X c X7 - 0.02812X oX cX_3 5 7 3 5 7











1.518 118 0.013 0.391 1.000C
1.739 2
8.352 254 0.033
SUM OF MEAN F PROB







TCTAL 199.807 3 34
** INDICATES SIGNIFICANCE AT .05
**** INDICATES SIGNIFICANCE AT .01
PERCENT VARIABILITY THAT CAN BE EXPLAINED BY REGRESSION: 44.0400
PERCENT VARIABILITY EXPLAINED BY THE SELECTEC MODEL: 35.6190
SAMPLE MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFIC I ENT :0. 5968
STANDARD DEVIATION OF RESIDUALS: 0.1048
MEAN RESIDUAL MAGNITUDE: 0.0313
VAXIMLM OEVIATION BETWEEN PREDICTED Si OBSERVED VALUES: C. 291GD+0C
PERCENTAGE OF OBSERVED VALUES FALLING
WITHIN HONE) STANDARD DEVIATION OF REGRESSION LINE: 69.53?
PEFCENTAGE OF CBSEFVED VALUES FALLING
WITHIN 2(TWC) STANDARD DEVIATIONS REGRESSION LINE: 93.753
NUMBER OF RESIDUALS WHOSE MAGNITUDE IS GREATER
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+1 if 10-20 or more than 30 vehicles in kill zone
-1 if less than 10 or 20-30 vehicles in kill zone
+1 if more than 20 vehicles are in the kill zone
-1 if less than 20 vehicles are in the kill zone
+1 if the follow on force is 30-60 minutes away
or no information is available.
-1 if the follow on force is less than 30 or greater
than 60 minutes away
+1 if the enemy follow-on force is more than sixty
minutes away or no information available.
-1 if the enemy follow-on force is less than sixty
minutes away from friendly positions
+1 if the mission of the friendly force is strong-
point defense
-1 if the mission of the friendly force is defense
in sector.
+1 if artillery response time is 2-4 minutes or
greater than six minutes
-1 artillery response time is less than 2 minutes
or 4-6 minutes.
/ +1 if artillery response time is greater than four
) minutes
-1 artillery response time is less than four minutes
The model depicted here is typical of the positive
and negative factors that a tactical decision-maker will have
to weigh as he makes his decisions. It would, however, be
very difficult to make a decision based on these factors alone
This would become apparent in a sensitivity test of the model
which would require a comparison of target priority rankings
by the model and another group of subjects.
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J. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
The results of the analysis clearly indicate some of the
thinking that was done by the subject. The thinking of the
task force commander can be modelled using the questionnaires
as an experimental tool, and might possibly be done using
other tools. Obviously, all of the factors were not investi-
gated and others may have influenced the subject's decision-
making process. More specifically, thirteen other factors
were not investigated due to the simplification necessary to
conduct an experiment using a questionnaire. These thirteen
factors should be analyzed perhaps with another experimental
tool. Other factors that were not investigated and often
used but difficult to analyze are the map itself, the impact
of terrain, and the various types and amounts of ammunitions.
Time also plays an important part since the decision to mass
artillery is certainly a question of timing if the results
are to be successful.
In a later chapter another experimental tool will be
examined. The computer wargame might possibly be able to
account for some of the additional factors that go into the
decision. Perhaps the computer, with its ability to store
the values of more variables, will give a wargame the ability
to account for other factors that now reside in the residual
term of the questionnaire, results.
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In designing an experiment of this type the most critical
factor was a sample that was representative of the population.
Without the expertise that was built into the sample, none of
the results would have had validity. For anyone interested in
conducting an experiment of this type, it is essential that
the sample size be determined in the. early stages of the design
This will dictate how many variables can be analyzed and how
many replications of the data it is possible to obtain. The
tools for analysis are available using CPT Broussard's program.
Having discussed the analysis of a decision using a ques-
tionnaire it might be useful to draw some comparisons between
other experimental tools. The next chapter will address the
use of other tools in analyzing decisions and some of the
advantages and disadavantages of each.
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IV. A COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL TOOLS
One of the desirable traits of an experimental tool to
be used in analyzing decisions is realism. The more realism
in the experiment, the more a subject will react to a situ-
ation as he would in a combat environment. The word real is
defined as "Existing as a thing, state or quality" [Ref. 7:
p. 1890]. The decision to mass fires on a kill zone occurs
only in a war, which is not usable as an experimental tool.
In addition, the experimenter cannot control all the variables
incidental to the desired independent variables which influ-
ence the decision-maker. Realism can cause the cost of an
experiment to rise rapidly. Additional personnel may be
needed as data collectors and additional equipment may be
necessary to support them. Even with additional personnel
and equipment, the control of an experiment in a very realis-
tic situation may be impossible.
The tools that are available to use are historical exam-
ples of a commander massing his artillery on a kill zone, a
manual wargame , computer simulations, interactive computer
wargames, commander post exercises and field training exer-
cises. Each of these could be used in an analysis of a
decision. Data collection should not have a high cost, so
the requirement that the tool not be manpower and equipment
intensive must be taken into consideration.
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The interactive computer wargame has the potential to
meet the requirements. It is somewhat of a compromise
between the realism of war and the total experimental control
of a questionnaire. The interactive computer wargame allows
a player to be the tactical decision-maker in a computer-
generated scenario. He can make decisions and allocate
resources within the constraints of the game and is able to
become involved in an environment that is more realistic
than a questionnaire generated scenario. The interactive
wargame is also useful in that it is capable of obtaining
information (data collection) , storing that information, and
analyzing it without the use of additional personnel and
equipment. Furthermore, it has a much lower cost than a
command post exercise (CPX) , or a field training exercise
(FTX). . A simple matrix might best explain the various experi-
mental tools and how they might be rated against the criteria
of interest. This matrix is shown in Table VI.
The element of cost is but one argument for using an
interactive wargame over a CPX or an FTX. Each of the experi-
mental tools give up realism to a degree while exhibiting
potential for experimental use. A series of historical exam-
ples from battles of the past are certainly realistic, however,
the accounts are based on the subjective views of the author
and are frequently secondary sources of information. Seldom
is combat recorded as it actually happens and seldom does it
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take into account all the variables that influence a decision
A historical example is realistic but cannot be used as the
only source of data for analysis.
TABLE VI
EXPERIMENTAL TOOLS AND CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
ANALYSIS
TOOL REALISM COST CAPABILITY COMPLEXITY
HISTORICAL HIGH LOW LOW VARIES
QUESTIONNAIRE LOW LOW HIGH SIMPLE
MANUAL WARGAME HIGH VARIES LOW VARIES
COMPUTER
SIMULATION MEDIUM HIGH HIGH COMPLEX
COMPUTER
WARGAME HIGH HIGH HIGH COMPLEX
CPX/FTX HIGH VERY HIGH LOW COMPLEX
A manual wargame is much less expensive to play. It
does require a decision-maker to be skilled in the rules.
It is normally time consuming and requires numerous people
if it is a large, realistic game such as PEGASUS. It also
requires data collectors and analysts for any experiment.
A computer simulation has assessment algorithms that are
hopefully doctrinally correct and are capable of performing
high speed computations and statistical analysis. However,
the decision to mass fires is a human decision and the lack
of man-machine interaction during the course of a scenario
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degrades its usefulness for an experiment that is trying to
analyze a tactical decision. The analysis of the factors
that influence a human decision must start with the decision
by a human. A computer simulation does not allow for this
as an experimental tool.
CPX's and FTX' s are conducted periodically on all major
Army installations They are the most realistic of all the
tools available. As previously mentioned, they are expensive
and also time consuming. In terms of data collection and
analysis, they present some difficulty. Normally CPX's and
FTX's are used for training and operational testing. They
are never replicated. The experimental procedure would be
to collect data for one repetition which creates some prob-
lems for analysis. In addition, the requirements for data
collectors are manpower intensive, and analysis can only be
performed manually upon completion of the exercise. The
possibility does exist for some experimentation to be con-
ducted during an exercise and incidental to the exercise.
This will be discussed in the last chapter.
The interactive wargame probably has the most potential
for injecting realism in decision-making while exhibiting
sufficient control over an experiment to allow for efficient
data collection and analysis. The JANUS wargame has been
chosen for this particular research based on its capability.
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V. AN INTRODUCTION TO JANUS
A. A DESCRIPTION OF JANUS
JANUS was developed by the. Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratories associated with the University of California.
JANUS may be available for student research at the Naval
Postgraduate School in the near future. It is currently
undergoing transition from a small computer to a much larger
computer, and its capability and flexibility will be con-
siderably increased.
JANUS is an interactive computer wargame that currently
simulates combat from brigade down to item Ctank section,
infantry squad or howitzer section) level. JANUS is played
by four players and controlled by one or two others. Two
players may play the blue or allied forces and two play the
red or Warsaw Pact forces. In the scenario currently being
run in JANUS , the red forces are specified as Warsaw Pact
motorized rifle divisions and its smallest element is a T-72
tank platton or a 3MP platoon with SAGGER anti-tank missiles,
The blue forces currently have an armored brigade, augmented
by artillery, attack helicopters, combat engineers and addi-
tional reconnaissance assets. The player is free to choose
any size element he desires to play. In addition, he may
choose any of a number of combat support elements such as




The two players on each, side have different tasks. One
normally controls the maneuvering direct-fire weapons, while
the other controls indirect fires. Each player has his own
color graphics terminal (CGTl to observe the action. The
game allows the players to formulate plans, organize their
own forces and set up the operation, as well as pre-plan
indirect fires for the operation prior to starting the game.
Once the game begins, the direct fire player acts as the
maneuver unit commander while the indirect fire player












Figure 5. JANUS Workspace.
The game operation is simple. All operations are done by
selecting an item from a menu which is located on the CGT next
to the area of combat as shown in Figure 5. The player simply
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moves the disk across the tablet which moves a corresponding
cross-hair on the CGT. Once the. cross-hair is on the item in
the menu that is desired, the player pushes a button on the
disk and then executes the appropriate procedure for the menu
item selected. Personal experience of the author indicates
that the mechanics of the wargame are easily learned in one
or two hours.
Contact is initiated automatically when line of sight
between opposing forces within the maximum range of the
weapon systems has been achieved. Artillery is fired by
designating a target area and physically connecting it to
a battery or batteries of artillery that have been placed in
support of the maneuver element during the planning of the
operation. The connection is done by the indirect fire player
who designates the target area with the cross-hairs on the
screen, and connects it to the batteries by moving the cross-
hairs over them and pushing the button on the manuever disk.
JANUS has some features that may cause difficulty in
collecting and analyzing data in an experiment involving the
decision to mass artillery on a kill zone. The game is
designed only for two players to a side. A battalion task
force has several players that may have an influence on the
decision. There are provisions for playing the game with
more personnel involved, but the equipment such as an inter-
com system required for playing with more personnel is not
part of the current configuration. The direct fire engage-
ments that a player may want to control to coordinate with
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his indirect fires cannot be. directly controlled. The
player can control the position of the item, but the software
is designed to initiate the fires of an item if its target is
within range of its main armament, and the item has acquired
the target. If both of these, occur, the firing is done by
the computer without control of the player. Indirect fires
are also automatically fired once the firing battery and the
target have been designated by the indirect fire player.
B. THE USE OF JANUS FOR FACTORIAL DESIGN EXPERIMENTS
The use of JANUS for experimentation should incorporate,
the realism of the game and the data collection and processing
capabilities that can be or already have been built into the
computer. In addition, the cost of such a wargame should be
minimized by conducting experiments that absolutely cannot be
performed by any other experimental tools that might be less
costly.
In terms of analzying a decision as a function of some
independent variables, a logical experiment might be to
analyze a decision in terms of the variables and in terms of
time. The impact of cost of the system would dictate that
perhaps a wargame could be used to elaborate on the question-
naire experiment by introducing another variable (time),. It
makes no sense to repeat the same experiment on a multi-




The author attempted to design such an experiment,
however, several problems arose that made the design either
invalid or too costly and software intensive. It became
apparent that the assumption of independence between time and
any other independent variable was not valid. The only way
that time could be included in this experiment was to stop the
game at time increments, T.. The values of the other indepen-
dent variables, for instance, the number of vehicles in a kill
zone would have a certain value at time, T .. . They would, in
fact, be dependent variables on the only independent variable,
time.
Recall that the procedure used in the questionnaire to
arrive at the independent variables was to informally survey
a sample of the population and collect their responses to what
variables they would consider important in making the decision
to mass artillery forces. If one were to do this for JANUS the
same approach would be required. Once chosen, the independent
variables would have to be implemented into the data base and
a subprogram would have to be written so that each treatment is
used during the game. This is all but impossible.
It must be concluded then, that because the invalidity of
the assumptions of the experiment and the overriding cost of
software modifications to design an experiment, full factorial




The purpose of this thesis was to investigate an Army
tactical commander's decision making process by focusing on
one decision and attempting to describe the decision in terms
of some independent variables. The motivation for this was
2
to try to relate a tactical C system's value to the effec-
tiveness of a tactical unit in combat. The author contends
that the tactical decision-making process, based on variables
that are part of the tactical environment, fits Lawson '
s
2
model of a C system. This may be a point of disagreement
since it follows Lawson ' s simplified model and therefore may
tend to oversimplify a very complex process. However, the
author must conclude that the basics of command and control
are the authority of the commander and the decisions, which
are influenced by the environment, are made to control his
resources.
The experiment conducted to investigate the variables that
influence the decision to mass artillery fires was completed
using a questionnaire. It is concluded that this technique
can be used to analyze this decision and probably can be used
for other tactical decisions provided that independent
variables have specific well-defined values. The questionnaire




Other experimental tools such as simulations, field
training exercises and command post exercises have many
advantages over a questionnaire. Among them are more-
realism and a better capability for collecting and processing
data. Disadvantages of these other experimental tools are
higher cost of experimentation and less control over the.
factors that influence the decision.
The interactive computer wargame , JANUS, was de.scribed
as a very high resolution wargame that was simple to use and
had some data collection capabilities that would allow for
some experimentation. However, the author attempted to de-
sign an experiment to investigate a tactical decision and
found JANUS to be unsuited for such uses. The high cost of
software modification would far outweigh the usefulness of a
full factorial experiment. In addition, the full factorial
experiment design that seemed appropriate for such an experi-
mental tool proved faulty in that it could not meet the
assumptions of the analysis.
One can conclude that more experimental tools are needed
to further investigate tactical decision-making beyond the
analysis found in the questionnaire experiment. If the objec-
tive of relating an improved C6 system to improved effective-
ness is still the motivation for further research, then the







This questionnaire is designed to investigate the tacti-
cal commander's decision-making process. A tactical commander
makes decisions based on various factors influencing a situa-
tion. This questionnaire will provide a means for analyzing
the commander's decision-making process based on the factors
that influence the situation. Not all the factors that
influence a decision will be investigated. This is not an
oversight but a technique to simplify the analysis of the
decision.
The questionnaire focuses on a single decision: the
battalion commander's decision to mass artillery on a designa-
ted trigger area or kill zone. The procedure used is to vary
some of the factors that influence the decision and obtain
a response based on the situation presented. Read carefully
the next section which gives the general situation of the
questionnaire and the assumptions inherent in the situation.
B. GENERAL SITUATION
You are the battalion/task force commander of an armored
task force consisting of two tank companies and one mechanized
infantry company. The task force is a part of an armored
brigade in an armored division engaged in battle against
Warsaw Pact forces in south central West Germany. The enemy
force, presently attacking, has engaged the covering force
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elements and is continuing to attack towards the division's
main battle area. The Warsaw Pact forces are equipped with
T-62/72 tanks, BRDM, and BMP. They are organized into their
echeloned structure that is the doctrine of the Warsaw Pact.
The battalion/task force is defending in the main battle
area. The direct fire weapons are M6 0A1/A3 tanks, Improved
TOW Vehicles and Dragons. Artillery support consists of one
155mm howitzer battery in direct support of the task force.
The remaining two batteries in the artillery battalion are
available if the task force commander decides to mass fires
on the trigger area/kill zone shown on the operations overlay.
The overlay shows three companies in the task force defending
from their initial battle positions. In addition, they are
conducting reconnaissance to prepare subsequent positions
approximately three kilometers to the south of their initial
positions (shown on overlay) . The plan for the defense is to
destroy the enemy with a large volume of direct and indirect
fires simultaneously as enemy vehicles enter the kill zone.
The decision to mass artillery will be made in conjunction
with a coordinated direct fire attack into the kill zone.
The purpose is to concentrate fires on the enemy and disrupt
the attack.
The terrain is typical of south, central West Germany.
Visibility is limited, however, it extends to the maximum
range of all direct fire weapons. Additional assumptions
are: the task force is at full strength in men and equipment,
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the trigger area/kill zone is within the maximum effective
range of the friendly anti-armor weapons. The task organiza-
tion for the friendly forces remains the same throughout the
experiment, daylight conditions exist throught the experiment;
friendly forces are defending along the forward line of
troops; the covering force has passed through the friendly
forces who are about to engage in their initial action of the
battle; the information given to the commander to make, his
decisions is not perfect information but reported information
from his intelligence elements; artillery ammunition is suffi-
cient to allow the artillery to support the mission of the
task force; the priority of fires is to the task force; the
direct support artillery has preplanned its targets on the
trigger area/kill zone and has registered on the kill zone.
Obstacles have been emplaced by combat engineers to channelize
the enemy into the trigger area/kill zone (see overlay)
.
C. SPECIAL SITUATION
As the commander of TF 2-8Q, you have decided to position
your forces in company battle positions shown on the accompany-
ing overlay. A/2-80 armor is on battle position (BP) A, B/2-80
armor is on BP C, and C/l-76 inf (mech) is on BP B. Each
company has a mission to defend from the battle position and
prepare the subsequent position to its immediate south (D,E,F)
The. trigger area/kill zone is marked in green and has been
designated on the overlay. Each of the subsequent pages will
give some additional information concerning this special
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situation. The information given will be divided into four
separate categories. After you have read this information
you will be asked two questions. The first question will
require a subjective numerical response, the second question
will require an answer of YES or NO. There are sixteen or
seventeen situations which require answers to these two
questions. When you have finished with one situation turn
the page to the next. This is not a timed test. Analyze the
general situation, special situation, assumptions and the
additional information given on each of the questionnaires
then answer the two questions based on the information given.




Read carefully the additional information. The information is listed
under four separate categories. An "X" will appear in the space preceding
a specific value to indicate the value for this particular situation.
These will vary for each situation. Please respond to the two questions
in the following manner; on the scale shown for the first question respond
with a vertical line in pencil or pen at the point you decide where the
appropriate answer to the question is located; an example is shown below.
10 20 30 40 50 60-4-75 80 90 100
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The second question should be marked with an "X" in the appropriate block
marked YES or NO.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A. The number of enemy forces in the trigger area/kill zone is:
Less than 10 enemy vehicles
X 10-20 enemy vehicles
20-30 enemy vehicles
Greater than 30 vehicles
S. The intelligence report on the enemy follow-on force is:
A battalion to regimental size force less than 30 minutes from
the task force's positions.
A battalion to regimental size force 30-60 minutes from the task
force's present positions.
X A battalion to regimental size force greater than 60 minutes from
the task force's present positions.
No information is current available about the follow-on enemy
force.
C. The mission of the friendly force is:
Defend in sector.
X Strongpoint defense.
D. The response time for the supporting artillery is:
Massed Artillery on the trigger area in less than 2 minutes.
Massed Artillery on the trigger area in 2-4 minutes.
Massed Artillery on the trigger area in 4-6 minutes.
X Massed Artillery on the trigger area in more than 6 minutes.
Based on the situation, assess the criticality of the information on the
scale below as to whether you would fire the mass of artillery now.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 sjo 100








TREATMENTS REPL #1 REPL #2 REPL #3
1. (1) 0.30 NO 1.00 NO 0.69 NO
2. G 0.50 NO 0.73 NO 0.75 NO
3. F 0.35 NO 0.63 NO 0.30 NO
4. FG 0.10 NO 0.85 NO 0.80 NO
5. E 0.55 NO 0.55 NO 0.10 NO
6. EG 0.40 NO 0.50 NO 0.80 NO
7. EF 0.80 NO 0.65 YES 0.60 NO
8. EFG 0.35 NO 0.85 NO 0.80 NO
9. D 0.40 NO 0.50 NO 0.75 NO
10. DG 0.50 NO 0.64 NO 0.80 NO
11. DF 0.41 NO 0.50 NO 0.63 NO
12. DFG 0.15 NO 0.54 NO 0.90 NO
13. DE 0.35 NO 0.54 NO 0.50 NO
14. DEG 0.50 NO 0.64 NO 0.25 NO
15. DEF 0.16 NO 0.75 NO 0.25 NO
16. DEFG 0.80 NO 0.76 NO 0.10 NO
17. C 0.31 NO 0.60 NO 0.50 NO
18. CG 0.40 YES 0.64 NO 0.30 NO
19. CF 0.70 NO 0.91 YES 0.90 NO
20. CFG 0.90 NO 0.65 NO 0.90 NO
21. CE 0.45 NO 0.63 NO 0.90 NO
22. CEG 0.50 NO 0.84 NO 0.75 NO




TREATMENTS REPL #1 REPL #2 REPL #3
24. CEFG 0.50 NO 0.30 NO 0.20 NO
25. CD 0.25 NO 0.50 NO 0.55 NO
26. CDG 0.24 NO 0.85 NO 0.30 NO
27. CDF 0.50 NO 0.50 NO 0.40 NO
28. CDFG 0.85 NO 0.65 NO 0.40 NO
29. CDE 0.20 YES 0.63 NO Q.30 NO
30. CDEG 0.35 NO 0.85 NO 0.63 NO
31. CDEF 0.60 NO 0.64 NO 0.50 NO
32. CDEFG 0.15 NO 0.40 NO 0.30 NO
33. B 0.90 YES 0.94 YES 0.75 YES
34. BG 0.45 NO 0.76 YES 0.75 NO
35. BF 0.50 NO 0.75 YES 0.70 YES
36. BFG 0.76 YES 0.85 YES 0.90 YES
37. BE 0.95 YES 0.65 NO 0.50 NO
38. BEG 0.65 NO 0.85 YES 0.60 YES
39. BEF 0.9Q YES 0.74 YES 0.43 NO
40. BEFG 0.75 NO 0.75 YES 0.91 NO
41. BD 0.94 YES 0.84 YES 0.75 YES
42. BDG 0.30 NO 0.83 YES Q.75 NO
43. BDF 0.90 NO 0.64 NO 0.50 NO
44. BDFG 0.50 NO 0.95 YES 0.60 NO
45. BDE 0.61 NO 0.93 YES Q.50 NO
46. BDEG 0.55 NO 0.75 YES 0.80 NO




TREATMENTS REPL #1 REPL #2 REPL #3
48. BDEFG 0.90 YES 0.80 YES 0.69 NO
49. BC 0.90 YES 0.74 YES 0.45 NO
50. BCG Q.90 YES 0.90 YES 0.50 NO
51. BCF 0.85 YES 0.76 NO 0.80 NO
52. BCFG 0.55 NO 0.80 YES 0.61 NO
53. BCE 0.90 YES 0.94 YES 0.80 NO
54. BCEG 0.40 NO 0.69 NO 0.75 YES
55. BCEF 0.50 NO 1.00 YES 0.60 NO
56. 3CEFG 0.45 NO 0.83 YES 0.6Q NO
57. BCD Q.20 NO Q.76 YES 0.44 NO
58. BCDG 0.60 YES 1.00 YES 0.50 NO
59. BCDF 0.50 YES 0.85 YES 0.60 NO
60. BCDFG 0.75 YES 1.00 YES 0.50 NO
61. BCDE 0.90 YES 1.00 YES 0.85 YES
62. BCDEG 0.90 YES 0.95 YES 0.70 NO
63. BCDEF 0.90 YES 0.65 YES Q.3Q NO
64. BCDEFG 0.20 NO 0.64 NO 0.90 YES
65. A 0.45 NO 1.00 NO 0.30 NO
66. AG 0.65 NO 0.85 YES 0.46 NO
67. AF 0.64 NO 1.00 NO 0.97 YES
68. AFG 0.70 NO 0.70 NO 0.80 NO
69. AE 0.5Q NO 0.40 NO 0.50 NO
70. A EG 0.7Q YES 0.74 NO 0.40 NO
71. A EF 0.70 YES 0.70 NO 0.90 NO




TREATMENTS REPL #1 REPL #2 REPL #3
73. AD 0.70 NO 0.94 YES 0.80 NO
74. ADG 0.41 NO 0.75 YES 0.60 NO
75. ADF 0.75 YES 1.00 NO 0.70 NO
76. ADFG 0.80 NO 0.85 YES 0.70 NO
77. ADE 0.50 NO 0.60 NO 0.80 YES
78. ADEG 0.70 NO 0.74 NO 0.32 NO
79. ADEF 0.55 NO 0.64 NO 0.10 NO
80. ADEFG 0.80 YES 0.65 NO 0.90 NO
81. AC 0.80 NO 0.75 YES 0.45 NO
82. ACG 0.80 NO 0.75 NO 0.70 NO
83. ACF 0.50 NO 0.50 NO 0.70 NO
84. ACFG 0.45 NO 0.85 NO 0.50 NO
85. ACE 0.70 NO Q.75 NO Q.9Q NO
86. ACEG 0.90 YES 0.65 NO 0.60 NO
87. ACEF 0.60 NO Q.65 YES 0.60 NO
88. ACEFG 0.50 NO 0.75 YES 0.42 NO
89. ACD 0.80 YES 0.64 NO 0.50 NO
90. ACDG 0.70 NO 0.74 YES 0.80 NO
91. ACDF 0.90 YES 0.80 YES 0.30 NO
92. ADDFG 0.25 NO 1.00 NO 0.50 NO
93. ACDE 0.80 NO 0.55 NO 0.64 NO
94. ACDEG 0.70 NO 0.64 NO 0.60 NO
95. ACDEF 0.70 YES 0.31 YES 0.90 YES




TREATMENTS REPL #1 REPL #2 REPL #3
97. AB 0.95 YES 0.84 YES 0.99 YES
98. ABG 0.90 YES Q.85 YES 0.90 YES
99. ABP 0.97 YES Q.85 YES 0.65 NO
100. ABPG 0.80 YES 1.00 YES 0.80 YES
101. ABE 0.75 YES 0.98 YES 0.80 YES
102. ABEG 1.00 YES 0.71 YES 0.75 YES
103. ABEF 0.90 YES 0.77 YES 0.50 NO
104. ABEFG 0.95 YES 1.00 YES Q.8Q YES
105. ABD 0.90 YES Q.85 YES 0.20 NO
106. ABDG Q.80 YES 0.82 YES 0.68 NO
107. ABDF 0.96 YES 0.84 YES 0.50 NO
108. ABDFG 0.90 YES Q.9Q YES 0.55 NO
109. ABDE 0.9Q YES 0.82 YES 0.46 NO
110. ABDEG 0.30 NO 1.00 YES 0.8Q NO
111. ABDEF 0.92 YES 1.Q0 YES 0.90 YES
112. ABDEFG 0.90 YES 1.00 YES Q.9Q NO
113. ABC 0.90 YES Q.85 YES 0.55 NO
114. ABCG 0.55 YES l.OQ YES 0.64 NO
115. ABCF 0.30 YES Q.84 YES 0.65 NO
116. ABCFG 0.50 YES Q.85 YES 0.65 YES
117. ABCE l.QQ YES Q.77 YES Q.90 YES
118. ABCEG o.ao YES 1.00 YES 0.9Q YES
119. ABCEF Q.80 YES 1.00 YES 0.99 NO




TREATMENTS REPL #1 REPL #2 REPL #3
121. ABCD 1.00 YES 0.94 YES 0.40 NO
122. ABCDG 0.60 YES 1.00 YES 0.80 YES
12 3. ABCDF 0.70 YES 0.94 YES 0.80 YES
124. ABCDFG 0.70 YES 0.84 YES 0.63 NO
125. ABODE 1.00 YES 1.00 YES 0.74 YES
126. ABCDEG 0.93 YES 1.00 YES 0.75 YES
12 7. ABCDEF 0.96 YES 1.00 YES 0.71 YES
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